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t is urgent that the EU should follow 
up on UN Resolution 1701 and the 
deployment of member states’ 
troops to Lebanon with a strategic-
diplomatic initiative aimed at the 
fundamental problem, namely the lack 
of an agreed resolution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. The reasons for this 
are a mix of old and new; reasons which 
are rooted in the international, European 
and Middle Eastern domains. 
The unresolved conflict remains poison 
for the international relations of the 
region and the world. The Palestinian 
cause did not create Osama bin Laden 
and Al Qaeda, but the persistence of the 
conflict, coupled with the escalating 
Middle Eastern crises in Lebanon, Iraq 
and Iran have had a threefold 
detrimental effect on the aim to 
eradicate terrorism. They have helped 
al-Qaeda ideologues lump together 
different sets of fundamentally 
unconnected crises, in their quest to 
forge a global ummah in pursuit of a 
global  jihad. They have been a prime 
recruitment motivation of Islamic 
terrorists in Europe. They have also 
acted as a key factor in the escalating 
degradation of relations between Islam 
and the West.  
The EU and its member states could 
now take the initiative diplomatically, 
both because it has a reasonably 
balanced position between the 
adversaries and because of its 
deepening involvement the Middle East 
conflict in terms of financial resources 
and manpower. The EU tried to get the 
peace process going in 2002 with the 
US, Russia and UN in the ‘Quartet’. 
Under the Danish Presidency at the time 
it drafted a first version of the 
‘Roadmap’ as a means to engage the 
Bush administration in the moribund 
peace process, and so to integrate the 
newfound US and Israeli concerns over 
Palestinian governance in a comprehen-
sive framework, leading eventually to a 
two-state solution. But in addition to 
Israel’s reservations to the Roadmap, 
the US took over the agenda of the 
Quartet, which in practice sought sound 
democratic governance (and the 
removal of then president Arafat) in the 
Palestinian Territories as a precondition 
for negotiations over statehood or the 
final map. The EU went along with this 
out of deference to the US and the 
strong European perception that a peace 
process, to have any chance of success, 
required American leadership. In 
practice the Roadmap was stillborn, 
although at the declaratory level it 
remained part of the official and public 
discourse up until the summer of 2006.  
Despite stalemate in the Roadmap, the 
EU nonetheless continued to pour time, 
effort and resources into reviving the 
peace process. Between 2002 and 2005, 
it devoted increasing financial and 
technical resources to the Palestinian 
Authority and its reform process, with 
some discernible successes in the fiscal 
and judicial domains in particular. In 
2004 and 2005, coupled with the work 
of the Quartet’s Special Envoy for 
Disengagement, it attempted to mitigate 
the detrimental effects of the Gaza 
disengagement, took an active role in 
Gaza’s border management (through the 
EU mission in Rafah), and 
unsuccessfully tried to mould Sharon’s 
unilateralism into a revived Roadmap 
process. In 2006, while having 
sanctioned the elected Hamas-led PA, 
the EU contributed to pulling the 
Palestinian Authority back from the 
brink, elaborating an International 
Temporary Mechanism in order to 
channel funds to the collapsing 
Authority. Yet despite these efforts, 
today the Roadmap is dead and there is 
no peace plan or process in sight.   
However, the Lebanon war and the 
European peacekeeping efforts there 
have heightened EU stakes in Middle 
East peace. The EU is obliged now to 
take the initiative on the political front, 
since it has its soldiers exposed to the 
hazards of crossfire between the Israeli 
army and Hezbollah. Italy is in the lead 
with 3,000 troops. Prime Minister Prodi 
has acted swiftly and impressively. Also 
as regards the southern Palestinian 
front, Foreign Minister D’Alema has 
hinted at a possible peacekeeping 
involvement in the Gaza Strip, which 
would be decided on the basis of 
experience on the Lebanese front with 
the strengthened UNIFIL mission.  
Yet peacekeeping alone in Lebanon and 
more so in the Gaza Strip runs the risk 
of enmeshing European forces into an 
endless ‘mission impossible’. 
Peacekeeping, with any chance of 
success, must be accompanied by 
strategic diplomatic action aimed at 
establishing legitimate and recognized 
borders to be protected, to the north, 
south, and eventually to the east. 
Having taken the lead on the Lebanese 
front, Italy, with the EU, needs now to 
act strategically to protect its own 
people and pursue a solution to the 
Middle East conflict which has become 
an ever more pressing European 
interest.  
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A further reason for serious European 
diplomatic action is the state of Israeli 
policy itself. Israel’s strategy is now in 
tatters. Sharon’s disengagement plan 
emerged from the need to find an 
alternative to a negotiated two-state 
agreement. Citing as excuses Arafat’s 
ambivalence, followed by Abbas’ 
impotence and finally Hamas’ 
radicalism, the Israeli authorities 
forcefully argued – backed by the 
majority of the public – that unilateral-
ism was the only game in town. 
Sharon’s Gaza disengagement was 
conducted smoothly and peacefully. It 
gave birth to a new centrist party – 
Kadima – which reflected the 
mainstream goal of the Zionist left and 
right to reconcile the competing claims 
of territorial expansion and 
demographic control.  
Kadima, taken over by Ehud Olmert, 
ran and won the March 2006 elections 
on a bid to ‘do Gaza in the West Bank’. 
Together with the tightening grip over 
East Jerusalem and the West Bank, the 
cordoning-off of the Jordan valley, and 
the construction of the euphemistically-
dubbed ‘separation barrier’, 
‘convergence’ was the word on 
everyone’s lips in the spring of 2006. 
Kadima’s convergence plan was to 
rationalize its occupation of the West 
Bank through a realignment of its 
presence and control. Doing so could 
raise the chances of international 
recognition of Israel’s annexation of 
large swathes of occupied territory, 
while concomitantly avoiding to absorb 
large number of Palestinians with it. In 
the absence of a state on ‘their side’ of 
the wall, Palestinians would be 
governed through a mix of local self-
government and heavy international 
civilian and possibly military presence. 
The events of the summer of 2006 
shattered the plan. Qassam rockets fired 
from Gaza into Israel and the war that 
Israel unleashed on the Strip shelved the 
hope that disengagement would end 
occupation and propel the region into 
relative stability. The Lebanon war 
proved that military means alone, 
cannot provide Israel with the security it 
justifiably yearns for. The previously 
invincible IDF was unable to destroy 
Hezbollah, which on the contrary 
bolstered its reputation in the Arab 
world. Likewise, the IDF has failed to 
eradicate Hamas or the Palestinian 
public’s support for it, despite its 
military actions, assassinations and 
widespread arrests. The Israeli public 
has visibly backed away from its 
support for unilateral disengagements. 
A recent poll published in Yediot 
Ahronot (25 August) revealed that a 
mere 9% of the Israeli public still backs 
Olmert’s convergence plan. Those who 
want peace have to find a different way. 
Sharon’s unilateralism, inherited by 
Olmert, is not working.   
What should the EU do? It should 
convene a conference of the parties and 
its Quartet partners, and table as 
primary working documents the March 
2002 Arab League Peace Initiative and 
the October 2003 Geneva Accords. The 
Arab peace plan for the first time 
offered a comprehensive peace with 
Israel in return for the establishment of 
a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, 
a just and agreed solution to the refugee 
problem as well as Israel’s withdrawal 
from Syrian and Lebanese territory. 
Providing substantive detail on the 
Israeli-Palestinian dossier, the Geneva 
Accord of 19 October 2003, is the most 
well-prepared and detailed peace plan 
that exists, and was signed by a 
distinguished group of about 70 Israeli 
and Palestinian independent individuals.  
The document treats the issues of 
statehood, the map (the pre-1967 map 
subject to agreed reciprocal land swaps 
on a 1:1 basis), a guaranteed land 
corridor between the West Bank and 
Gaza, Jerusalem’s holy sites, the 
security regime and the refugees (with 
multiple options, but leaving Israel the 
sovereign right to determine the number 
that it would accept back). Some parts 
of the wall would have to be 
dismantled, which is what the Israeli 
government has always claimed could 
be the case. Most obviously are those 
parts of the wall, especially in East 
Jerusalem, that separate Palestinians 
from Palestinians, leaving many on the 
‘wrong side’ of the barrier. As in the 
Arab Peace Initiative, the details of the 
Lebanese-Syrian parts of the conflict 
with Israel should of course be added to 
the content of the Geneva Accord. Israel 
would withdraw from the Golan 
Heights and Sheba farms as part of the 
complete and final settlement.  
The EU could propose that the parties 
agree in the first instance to put to 
referenda the following question: “Do 
you agree that the Arab Peace Initiative 
and the Geneva Accord should be the 
basis for negotiations for a permanent 
and complete settlement of the 
conflict?” One can speculate that today, 
or tomorrow after some debate, both 
parties would deliver majorities in 
favour. The negotiators would then 
have entirely new terms of reference for 
finishing off quickly the details of land 
swaps, refugee arrangements and 
security provisions.  
The Sharon and Olmert governments 
cold-shouldered the Geneva Accord. 
But now Israel faces a new situation, in 
which the Sharon/Olmert policies are 
seen to have been disastrous. Several 
Israeli politicians, including Defence 
Minister Amir Perez and Foreign 
Minister Tzipi Livni have expressed 
support for renewed negotiations. The 
Geneva Initiative has re-launched a new 
campaign to sensitize and rally support 
for its cause. Israel is a democracy, and 
should accept the verdict of the 
consultative referendum. Would the 
Palestinians accept shelving various 
elements of old rhetoric concerning the 
objective of destroying the state of 
Israel?  
All signals suggest that they would. The 
prisoners’ document, which endorsed 
the notion of a two-state solution, was 
signed by a senior member of Hamas 
(as well as by representatives of Fatah 
and other minor factions). The 
document could serve as a basis for a 
much-needed national reconciliation, 
which could herald the establishment of 
a national unity government that would 
also normalize its relations with the 
international community.  
Would the US once again mount such a 
set of pre-conditions that the process 
would stall, just like the Roadmap? The 
US knows that its Middle East policies 
have been a set of serial disasters, all of 
them from Israel-Palestine to Iraq and 
Iran. The EU should proceed with 
resolve and clarity, and collect the 
support of the Arab world and Russia as 
its Quartet partner. Perhaps the US 
would be heartily relieved to see the EU 
do this. If it sought to block it, it would 
do so at its own risk, in opposing alone 
the rest of world, which is not 
something it would want to do at this 
time.  
 